It was a time when the whole world was waiting for the spectacular unveiling of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The U.S. President George Bush and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin were just inches away fro each other, watching the greatest show on earth. However, this physical nearness was overwhelmed by the political distance in the Caucasus region where Russia launched a military operation in response to a rather ‘silly’ adventure of Mikheil Saakashvili, the president of Georgia. In a week long exchange or military wrath, Georgia is found to have paid a heavy price. Although there was a declaration of cessation of military operations, hostilities in the region are far from a complete end.
But why waging this unnecessary war? Both sides of Georgia and Russia have their own logics about the legitimacy of the conflict. Many critics would argue that it was due to a test-drive of the U.S. administration to assess the military capabilities, determination and power of Russia; Georgia by far has a reputation of being American ally in the region. But the conflict in the Caucasus seemed much overdue since the birth of the breakaway semiautonomous provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A brief look back would help understand the backdrop of the events that made quite a movement in the recent international politics -
Twilight of Soviet Union saw a number of separatist movements – Georgia being the principal. With a rising pulse of separation in 1989 in Tbilisi, South Ossetia too, made its intention clear of being separate from Georgia. This resulted in violent clashes between Georgians and South Ossetians in Tskhinvali (capital of South Ossetia).
In 1990, South Ossetia with its 70,000 strong population (majority being Russians) declared its intention to secede from Tbilisi government which again escalated the conflict. Soviet forces were stationed in the region to keep a peace that ultimately seemed futile.
With the demise of Soviet Union and Georgia becoming independent in 1991, nothing happened in South Ossetia in Georgia’s favor. The intent of breaking away from Tbilisi did not die down in South Ossetia. A year long sporadic violence continued in the region till an agreement was reached for a deployment of Russian-Ossetian-Georgian peacekeeping force. A political impasse continued over the issue of South Ossetia’s independence during Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze’s period till his ousting by ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003. With a landslide victory in the election that followed in 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili, the new president of Georgia held the reins with a commitment to heel the breakaway regions namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Nevertheless, Mikheil Saakashvili’s proposal of dialogue and conditional autonomy was vehemently opposed by the separatist especially those of South Ossetia.
An unrecognized referendum in 2006 portrayed the rejuvenated demand of independence by South Ossetians which was offset by a similar referendum by Georgian minority in South Ossetia who preferred to stay with Tbilisi administration. Since then sporadic clashes continued. Russia’s supportive posture to Tskhinvali along with the facts like most South Ossetians carrying Russian passports and using Rouble for trade caused an increasing anger in Tbilisi. It is no wonder that Georgia always wanted to release her dogs of war at some point of time.
In early August, this year, clashes mounted between South Ossetian separatist forces and Georgian troops and climaxed with Georgia launching aerial bombardment and land offensive against the breakaway region on 7 August. By 8 August, Georgian troops were in control of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali that ultimately lasted for hours only. Inaccessible terrain and approach conditions from the north to South Ossetia left Georgians happy and oblivious of fast moving Russian military forces. Soldiers, tanks and vehicles poured in at the same time when Georgian military control was established over Tskhinvali. The control soon became fragile and ultimately broke down completely when Russian air and ground attacks continued not only on Georgian forces in South Ossetia but other important parts of Georgia. At the end of what lasted for a week, Georgians paid higher price in terms of human and infrastructural casualties. Little sense of relief started to prevail in South Ossetia after Georgian troops pulled out of Tskhinvali.
Blame-game continued from the beginning of the hostilities between Georgian and Russian forces. Military and government version of logics behind Georgian offensive against Tskhinvali was for ‘restoring constitutional order’ by ‘neutralizing separatist fighters attacking civilians’. Russian authorities see their counter-offensive as a measure to protect their people in the region who are allegedly targeted by Georgian military. Russia even linked this hostile act of Georgia as a disqualification for NATO membership – a matter to Russia’s discomfort being long discussed amongst existing NATO members. As a presidential decree to declare ‘state of war’ got approved in the Georgian parliament on 9 August, Russian president expressed his commitment in forcing Georgians to peace duly supported by his prime minister Vladimir Putin’s claim of Georgia’s act of genocide.
Caught in the middle of the conflict, hundreds of civilian lives were lost, while thousands fled the ruined South Ossetia and Georgian town of Gori. Material losses were high on the side of the Georgians with certain areas of Tbilisi, Gori, and Port of Poti being damaged by Russian air bombardment.
Although Georgia started to pull out of South Ossetia as early as 10 August, Russian forces continued to advance beyond South Ossetia into her main land. Russian advances and operations inside Georgia provoked the U.S. only to make cautionary statements against Russia – an act that utterly disappointed a pro-U.S. Georgia in view of her anticipation of U.S. active involvement. Meanwhile diplomacy by EU intensified and a French-brokered peace plan was served to both the countries in dispute. The six point peace plan outlined:
- Complete end of use of force
- Granting free access to humanitarian aid
- Return of Georgian forces to places of permanent deployment
- Return of Russian forces to pre-conflict positions
- Complete cessation of military actions.
- Resumption of international talks on the future status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Following the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s four hour long meeting, President Saakashvili signed the agreement on 15 August. Initially it was rejected by Russia probably because it still wanted to consolidate her gains in posing a substantial threat to Georgia being inside her territory for days already. However, finally on 16 August, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the agreement. This agreement includes a provision that allows Russia to make additional security arrangements till the arrival of international observers to monitor the ceasefire.
Current situation in the Caucasus portrays a scene that is far from a lasting peace. It is a fact that with both sides signing the French-served peace plan, tensions have dropped substantially in the region. But with Russia’s intention of staying back till ‘additional security measures’ are in place and Mr. George Bush’s August 16 statement of ‘no room for debate’ on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two very fundamental points out of those six served, seem to be in distress. Without a complete withdrawal of Russians from South Ossetia and Georgian main land, Georgia remains under a threat. With an opposing U.S. attitude to the promised international talks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, separatist movements in these two breakaway regions may get reenergized throwing the entire Caucasus region in a volatile situation in future.
The international community will nervously watch the events that follow in next few days and weeks.
Contributor: Mohammad Yousuf